EMERSON vs. CLAYTON.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Gourt of Illinois.
EMERSON vs. CLAYTON.
Under a statute providing that the separate property of a married woman shall
remain under her sole control, &c., a married woman, as to her separate property. is in the condition of a feme sole, and may bring an action at law in her
own name, without joining her husband.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-On the twenty-first of February, 1861, an act was
passed by the General Assembly of this state, entitled " An Act
to protect married women in their separate property," which provides "That all the property, both real and personal, belonging
to any married woman, as her sole and separate property, or which
any woman hereafter married owns at the time of her marriage,
or which any married woman, during coverture, acquires, in good
faith, from any person, other than her husband, by descent, devise,
or otherwise, together with all the rents, issues, increase, and profits thereof, shall, notwithstanding her marriage, be and remain,
during coverture, her sole and separate property, under her sole
control, and be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed by her the
-same as though she was sole and unmarried; and shall not be
subject to the disposal, control, or interference of her husband,
and shall be exempt from execution or attachment for the debts
of her husband." Sess. Laws, 1861, page 148.
At the March Term, 1863, of the Clinton Circuit Court, the
plaintiff in error filed her plaint in that court in replevin for certain chattels, against the defendant in error, claiming the chattels
as her own property.
To this plaint the defendant pleaded in abatement the cover
turo of the plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of the suit.
To this plea, the plaintiff replied that the property sued for was,
during her coverture, acquired in good faith from persons other
than her husband, with her own money and in her own right, and
BREESE,
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as such remains her sole and separate property and under her sole
control, in virtue of the Act of February 21, 1861.
To this replication the defendant demurred, and the court sus.
tained the demurrer.
The questions presented by these pleadings are important, and
of the first impression in this court, and we have fully considered
them.
Before the enactment of this law, there can be no doubt a
feme covert could not sue alone for her own property, or institute
any suit in her own name for the recovery of any of her rights.,
Indeed, she had no rights of personal property; all belonged by
the marriage, to her husband, which he might have reduced into
his possession, and all was liable to become so subject.
The common law did not recognise the condition of a sole trader
in a feme covert, nor did it contemplate a case where a wife might
hold property separate and apart from her husband. By it the
personal estate of the wife vested in the husband, and it gave him
absolute dominion over such estate. In the progress of civilization,
an artificial state of society has grown up incompatible, to some
extent, with that state of simplicity from which many rules of the
common law have been derived, and affecting in a serious degree
the artificial relations of society, and among them, that of husband and: wife. In these days of excitement and speculation, by
which fortunes are wrecked in a moment, and the innocent made
to suffer from no misconduct of their own, it has been thougt wis(
and expedient by the legislature of this and of other states, to pro
tect the property of married women, not only from such catastro
phies, but to remove it entirely from the control of her husband,
and making her, as it regards such property, to all intents and
purposes a single woman.
Such a change in the relative rights and powers of husband and
wife, must, of necessity, give a different operation to the rules of
law by which they are to be governed. The right being vested in
the wife by the statute, it must, if the act is to be enforced,
remain intact until she consents to dispose of the property, for
this right includes full dominion over it. Her rights, then, are
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the only rights affected, and on the well-established principles of
the law, she alone must bring suit for any invasion of them. By
this statute, a married woman must, since its enactment, be considered a feme sole in regard to her estate of every sort owned by
her before marriage, or which she may acquire during coverture
in good faith from any person not her husband, by descent, devise,
or otherwise, together with all the rents, issues increases, and
profits thereof. And it is to be under her , sole control," and to
be held, owned, possessed, and enjoyed by her the same as though
she was sole and unmarried, and it is not subject to the disposal,
control, or interference of her husband, nor is it subject to execution or attachment for his debts.
Language more plain and explicit than this could hardly be
used to express the intention of the legislature.
They designed to make, and did make, a radical and thorough
change in the condition of a feme covert. She is unmarried, so far
as her property is concerned, and can deal with it as she pleases.
Having the " sole control" of it, there is no necessity of joining
her husband in an action to recover it, or for trespasses upon it.
The very object of the statute, it would seem, was to keep it out
of the control of her husband in any and every respect ; that the
wife should be wholly independent of him in regard to it. If this
were not so, the act itself would be futile and of no effect. The
husband, for purposes of his own, might refuse to join in an
action with the wife. He might connive with others to dispossess
her of her property. He might prefer that her property should
pay his debts, rather than his own should be seized for such purpose, and if so, it is not to be supposed he would join in replevin,
or in any other action to recover the possession.
We are well satisfied the act can have no very beneficial operation in favor of married women, o. oe effective in the protection of
her separate property, unless the "sole control" conferred upon
her over it, is made to extend to the commencement and prosecution of suits for its recovery, even against her husband, should
he, contrary to her wishes, and in contempt of her rights, unlawfully interfere with it. The right of , sole control" over the
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separate property of the wife by her, necessarily confers the power
to do whatever is necessary to the effectual assertion and maintenance of that right.
These views are sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, under a statute similar, in most respects, to our own. Good,year vs. Rumbaugh and Wife, 13 Penn. 480 ; Cummings' Appeal,
11 Id. 275.
We see no other mode by which this statute can be made effectual for the purposes contemplated by the legislature, than by
holding the wife, as to her separate property, to be in the condition of an unmarried woman, and capable of suing for its recovery in all courts.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause
remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the replication, and to permit the defendant to make up an issue thereon,
if he desires so to do.
J.-I concur in the decision of this case, as announced
in the foregoing opinion ; but am not prepared to hold that the
statute could affect title to property acquired before the passage
of the law. As there is nothing in the record to show that it was
not subsequently .acquired, I deem it unnecessary to discuss that
question. It will be time to do so if it shall be presented by a
rejoinder.
WALKER,

CATON,

C. J., did not sit in the case.

buring the last few years, many of
the states have passed laws for the protection of married women in their
iights of property, all more or less
similar to the one under which the present case arose, and so radical a change
in one of the most important relations
of society, has naturally been productive of frequent litigation. The precise
point involved in the present case has
not, however, often arisen, except in
those states whose statutes were among
the earlier ones passed, the litigation

immediately arising upon them having
called attention to the question, and led
to its being expressly provided for in
other states, in their statutes them.
selves.

Amongst the earliest of these sweeping changes in the law relating to the
property of married women, were the
acts of New York and Pennsylvania,
passed in the same week (April, 1848).
The principal part of the Pennsylvania act, alluded to in the principal case,
is in these words: "Every species and
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description of property. . which may be
owned by, orbelong to,any single woman,
shall continue to be the property of such
woman as fully after her marriage as before; and all such property, of whatever
name or kind, which shall accrue to any
married woman during coverture by will,
descent, deed of conveyance, or otherwise, shall be owned, used, and enjoyed
by such'married woman as her own separate property," &c. The first impression
of the courts, in the construction of this
act, was-that it made a radical change
in the condition of a feme covert, and
gave her, in all respects that concerned
her property, the full rights and privileges of a fene sole, and there are many
dicta to that effect: Cummings' Appeal,
1 Jones 272; Goodyear vs. Rumbaugh,
1 Harris 480; Shiedel vs. Weishlee, 4
Id. 138, &c. The subsequent cases,
however, have not been disposed to
give the act so wide a scope, and have
been adverse to a married woman's
possession of many powers claimed for
her under it. Thus her separate deed
has been held absolutely void: Peck vs.
Ward, 6 Harris 606; Thoradell vs. Morrison, 1 Casey 826; and even her deed
to release her dower: Ulp vs. Campbell, 7 Harris 361; the declarations of
the husband are not admissible to prove
property in the wife: Gamber vs. Gainher, 6 Harris 863; her separate assignment of a mortgage belonging to her is
void: Stoops vs. Blackford, 8 Casey
214; and so her bond: Steinman vs.
Ewing, 7 Wright 63; coverture is a bar
to an action on a promissory note:
Mahon vs. Gormley, 12 Harris 80; and
the expression in the act, "property...
which shall accrue to any married
woman during coverture by will, descent, deed of conveyance, or otherwise,"
does not give her any right to her own
earnings during coverture: Raybold vs.
Raybold, 8 Harris 308.

Upon the point in the principal case,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Goodyear vs. Rumbaugh, 1 Harris 480,
said that the wife might sue in her own
name. In the same year, however, as*
this decision (1850), an act was passed
declaring that any suit touching the
separate property of the wife, "may be
brought in the names of such married
woman and her husband, to the use,"
&c. It was the first opinion that the
latter act authorized, but did not enjoin
the action to be brought by both ; but
in Kennedy vs. Good, 9 Harris 849,
BLACK, C. J., says it should be brought
by both, to the use of the wife, and in
Ritter vs. Ritter, 7 Casey 396, WooDWARD, J., says that the Act of 1850
takes away the right of separate action.
In New York the mode of suit has
been provided for by the code, and by a
later act (1860), notwithstanding which,
cases even yet arise wherein the question is raised: Porter vs. Mount et al,
ante p. 493.
The ground of the common law rule
preventing the wife from bringing an
action in her own name, is her civil
merger in the husband, and it would
appear, therefore, that unless it be the
intention of the legislature to destroy
the unity of person resulting from the
merger, she would not be entitled to
sue in her own name, and it would be
difcult to foresee or provide for all
the consequences of such a sweeping
change, For this reason the courts of
Pennsylvania have held that the rights
and duties of the marital relation remain the same as before, except in the
particulars necessarily altered: Mahon
vs. Gormley, 12 Harris 80; and Chief
Justice BLACK says, Peck vs. Ward, 6
Harris 506, "the Act of 1848 makes
some important changes, but it does not
depose the man from his place at the
head of his family."
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In the case before us, the language
of the legislature is certainly explicit
and comprehensive enough to effect a
complete emancipation of the wife from
the restraints of marriage, so far as
regards her property; and the court
was no. doubt correct in. its deference to
the plain will of' the legislature. The
reasoning of the court as to the effects
of denying-the wife's power to sue alone
in caseswhere the husband isdisposed to

unlawfully interfere with her prorerty,
are very cogent; and it may be, that in
courts of strictly common law jurisdiction, substantial justice would sometimes fail to be done under a different
rule, but we apprehend that the decision will be fruitful in litigation, and
in the production of new and difficult
questions.
T. T. ML

In the (Courtof Appeals of
THE PEOPLE,

ez

ew York.

rel. THE BANK OF TEE COMMONWEATH,

V8.
THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE CITY OP
NEW YORK.
The Legislature of New York, by chapter 240 of the Laws of 1863, provided in
substance that banks shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the
amount of their capital stock paid in, or secured to be paid in, and their surplus
earnings less 10 per cent., deducting the value of their real estate. Held, that
the meaning of the-words "capital stock paid in, or secured to be paid in," as
construed by the legislative history of banking in New York, is the original
capital of a bank, as distinguished from that which it possesses when a given
tax is laid.
The Bank of C. having had a capital actually paid in of $750,000, had invested
about one-fourth of it in real estate, and the balance in the securities of the
United States. Held, that the bank was properly taxed, under the state law,
on the whole amount of its original capital.
the act in question does not conflict with the constitution of the state, or of the
United States.

This case came before the court on an appeal from a judgment
of the Supreme Court, affirming on certiorari the .determination
of the Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments, in assessing the
relator, the Bank of the Commonwealth, for the year 1863. The
relator is a banking corporation created pursuant to the general
I We owe this case to the kindness of INGRAHAM, J., who will please accept our
thanks.-Ens. Amx.L&w REG.
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banking law. It caused to be delivered, in proper season, to the
tax commissioners, a statement embracing the particular matters
required by the statute to be stated ; by which it appeared that its
capital actually paid in, and secured to be paid in, was the sum
of $750,000; that it had invested in real estate, consisting of
its banking-house in the first ward of the city, the sum of
$188,099.84, leaving a balance of capital of $561,900.16. It further stated that the bank had loaned to the Government of the United
States the whole balance of its personal property, namely, the sum
lastly above mentioned, " being the entire amount of their capital
stock after deducting the amount paid for real estate as aforesaid,
and that they have taken and hold for such loans the securities of
the United States, being stocks, bonds, notes, evidences of debt,
and securities for money." It therefore claimed to be exempt
from taxation except for the value of its said real estate. The
Commissioners rejected the claim to exemption, and the corporation was accordingly assessed the sum above mentioned in respect
to real estate, and the whole balance of $561,900 'as personal
estate. The bank sued out a certiorarito the Supreme Court
under the act of 1859, ch. 802, § 20.
The present appeal was from thejudgment of affirmance in the
Supreme Court of the proceedings of the Commissioners.
A. W. Bradford, for the appellant.'
John E. Develin and James T. Brady, for the respondents.
DENIO, C. J.-It must be considered a settled point that the

power of taxation residing in the state governments does not
embrace as a possible subject the securities of the public debt of
the United States. The Supreme Court of the United States, the
ultimate arbiter upon questions of federal power and constitutional
limitations upon state authority, having so pronounced, it becomes
the duty of the tribunals of the states, which, upon such subjects,
Mr. Daniel Lord was also heard on the general quoistion involved in the case,
he being of counsel for the appellant in the case of The People, ez rel. The Bank

of Commerce, vs. The Commisvioners of Tazes, &c., which was argued on the same
day, and depended upon the same question.
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are subordinate to the national court, to yield to the judgment
implicit and unreserved obedience. The circumstance that we
were unable to perceive the supposed repugnancy between the power
of the states to tax all the property of its citizens, and the authority committed to the general government to become the borrower
of money of any individual or corporation who might be willing to
lend it, will not justify us in attempting to qualify or evade the
plainly expressed opinion of the federal judiciary. I come to the
consideration of the question involved in this case, therefore,
unconscious of any bias arising out of the views which I entertained, and which I cannot avoid saying I individually still entertain, upon the power of the states over the subject of taxation for
state purposes. The consideration that since the former judgment of this.court, Congress has seen fit to affrm, so far as it had
power to do so, the construction by which the states are disabled
from the full exercise of this power, by a positive inhibition to tax
the property of our citizens invested in federal securities, would
not change my opinion, if the principle were now open for consideration. The question as to the power of Congress to intervene
was not before us on the former occasion, as no such act had then
Veen passed, and we therefore avoided all expression of opinion on
that subject; but if the states were not restrained by the Constitution itself, I think it was not in the power of Congress to
impose, by its own authority, a limitation of the power of
the state legislatures over the subject. But dismissing this
question as one settled against our opinions by the supreme
tribunal, the point now to be considered is: whether the effect of
the state law which was in force when the determination under
review was made, did assume to tax the securities of the general
government in the hands of the banks, or, in other words, whether
the assessment which is in controversy was upon these securities
&
or not.
The statute of this state on which the question arises, was
passed on the 29th of April, 1863, and took effect immediately
upon its passage. It is in these words: "All banks, banking
associations, and other moneyed corporations and associationg..
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shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of
their capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in, and their
surplus earnings (less ten per cent. of such surplus), in the manner
now provided by law, deducting the value of the real estate held
by any such corporation or association, and taxable as real estate."
(Ch. 240.)
The force of the words, paid in or secured to be paid in, if
otherwise obscure, will be understood by a reference to the legislative history of banking in this state. When banks were created
by spedial charter, the amount of capital stock and the number
and amount of shares was stated in the act, and it was usually
or at least sometimes provided that the institution might go into
operation when a given number of shares less than the whole had
been subscribed. So when the general banking law came to be
passed, the articles of association were required to state the
amount of the capital stock; and authority was given to increase
it. (Laws 1838, ch. 260, §§ 16, 20.) Then the periodical statements required to be made, were to specify "'the amount of the
capital stock paid in * * * or secured to be paid." (§ 26.) So
in regard to the chartered banks; they were to specify, in their
statements, "the amount of the capital stock of the corporation
paid in or invested, according to the provisions of its charter, and
the amount of such stock as then possessed." (2 R. S., 593, § 20.)
The distinction between capital originallypaid in or secured, and
that; possessed at a particular time, is sharply defined in various
provisions. For instance, in the limitation of the amount of loans
and discounts : they are not to exceed three times its capital
stock, then paid in and actually possessed. (Id., p. 589, § 1,
subd. 8). So in the safety fund act, there is a limitation as to the
circulating notes which may be issued, which are not to exceed
twice the capital stock then paid in and actually possessed. But
when the t; ition of this class of corporators comes to be pr. vided
tbr, it is the capital stock "paid in and secured to be paid in,"
which is to be stated by the corporate officers to the assessors, and
set down in their assessment rolls, and upon this the tax is to be
imposed (1 R. S., 414, 415, 416, §§ 1, 6, 10); and the same
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expression was used in the same connection in the act under immediate consideration. This amount of capital fixed by the charter
or articles of association, and either actually paid in or secured to
be paid in, is wholly irrespective of the moneys, securities, and
property which the corporation may at any given time possess,
and it may be a greater or less sum, varying from time to time,
as it necessarily must, according to the vicissitudes of business*and
the success of the enterprise. It is usually called the nominal
capital, to distinguish it from the amount of the positive assets
which may constitute the actual capital at any particular period.
The interest of the stockholders, called shares, are aliquot parts
of this nominal capital, and they are said to be at par when the
actual property or investment are supposed to be equal to the
amount paid. in or secured to be paid, or, in other words, to the
nominal capital, and to be above or below par, as the actual capiital shall be increased or diminished.
The assessment or valuation, which by the Revised Statutes is
to constitute the taxable personal property of the corporation, is
the amount of this nominal capital, after there has been deducted
from it, the amount paid, out for real estate, and the amount of
stock, if any, belonging to the state, and to literary and charita.
ble corporations. - (1 R. S., 415, §§ 6, 7.) Whatever may have
been the effect of these provisions, if they had remained unchanged,
upon the question we are considering, it is very clear that the same
effect must be attributed to the act of 1863.
Between the time of the enactment of the Revised Statutes and
the passage of the act of 1863, a very great alteration in principle
was made in the method of assessing and taxing this class of corporators. By the act of 1857 (ch. 456, § 8), the mode of arriving
at the valuation upon which the tax was to be levied, was altered
in an important respect. Instead of taxing the nominal capital,
expressed by the words capital paid in or secured to be paid in,
the officers were required to assess the capital stock at its actual
value. There were certain deductions to be made from that actual
value, which are not necessary to be now stated. The principal
feature of the alteration, was the departure from the nominal
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amount or the sum which had been originally paid in or secured
to be paid in, as the taxable valuation, and the substitution of the
real or actual value of the capital, that is, the moneys and other
property, independent of the real estate of the corporation possessed by it when the assessment is made. It was a change from
a valuation to some extent fictitious, to one, to be obtained by
actual inquiry, appraisement or other evidence, to be resorted to by
the assessors. The system established by the act of 1857 was
abolished by the act of 1863, and was superseded by the arrangements of that act. I cannot bring myself to entertain any doubt
that the intention of the legislature in passing this last-mentioned
act was to return substantially, and so far as this question is concerned exactly, to the system of the Revised Statutes. The nominal capital which was defined by the same precise words used in
the Revised Statutes, were again made use of to describe the taxable valuation upon which the corporation was to be taxed. In
declaring that such corporations should be liable to taxation upon
a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in and
secured to be paid in, they effected the same object which the
Revised Statutes had accomplished in enacting that the capital
stock paid in and secured to be paid/in, should be inserted in the
column of the valuations of personal estate, and that the capital
as thus valued and entered should be taxed like other real and
personal estate. The language is well and aptly chosen to denote
a return to a system of valuation and taxation which had been
firmly established by the Revised Statutes, and had been departed
from by the act of 1857. Some emphasis has been placed in the
argument, upon the word valuation as used in this act, as though
it indicated that an estimate or appraisal. of the capital of the company was to be made, at the time of assessing the corporation.
But a little regard to the phraseology of the tax laws will show
that the columns of the taxable amount of the real and personal
estate of the taxpayers are the valuation8 of the real and personal
estate of the several taxpayers, and the aggregate is the valuation
of the counties. A reference to 1 R. S., pp. 895 and 417, §§84
and 16, will make this very plain. The words "on a valuation

THE PEOPLE vs. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES.

equal to the amount of their capital stock," &c., mean nothing
more than if it had been said the corporation shall be taxed on an
amount equal to their capital stock paid in, &c.
I ought to mention that besides what I have called the nominal
capital of the corporations, their surplus earnings are, by this act
of 1863, to be added to the taxable valuation where they exceed
10 per cent. of their capital. This was a departure from the provisions of the Revised Statutes, and was first made in an act
passed in 1853. (Ch. 655). .1 do not perceive that this affects
the question to be decided. The principal subject to be taxed is,
after all, the nominal capital, and this is the precise taxable valuation in all cases where, as in this case, there is no surplus. To
ascertain the existence of a surplus, a judgment must, no doubt,
be exercised upon the amount of the capital on hand, but the only
change which is to be made, in case a surplus beyond the amount
mentioned is ascertained, is to add that surplus to the nominalcapital.
Having thus established that the act of 1863 was simply a
revival, with a single change, not material to this question, of the
system of valuation of the personal property established by the
Revised Statutes, we are to determine what the effect of that system was upon the.taxability of federal stocks held by the banks at
the time the assessors make their annual inquiries preparatory to
the making up of their assessment lists. It would seem plain
enough that it is entirely immaterial what the assets of the bank
then are. If the amount of the original nominal capital is alone
to be taken into account, it would be officious and improper, or at
least useless for the assessors (or the tax commissioners in the city
of New York), to make any examination or inquiry into the actual
assets. The Revised Statues required the bank officers to make
and deliver a statement of the amount of the nominal capital,
under the name of their capital stock, paid in or secured to be
paid in (1 R. S., 414, § 2); but they gave no such direction
respecting the capital or assets then possessed. The distinction
between these two items was, at that time, well understood, as has
been shown by the references to the statements required for other
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purposes, and to the limitations upon discounts and issues. It has
been settled, by repeated adjudications, that the loss of any part
of the original capital of a bank, such loss existing and known at
the time of making the assessment, would not influence in any
respect the amount of the taxable valuation; and, prior to the
change made by the act of 1858, that any increase of the assets
of a bank, by means of reserved profits, would not increase in any
way such taxable valuation. (Tie Bank of Utica vs. The City of
Utica, 4 Paige 399, Anno 1834; The People vs. The Board of
Supervisors of Niagara County, 4 Hill 203; The Farmers' Loan
and Trust Company vs. The Mayor, ft. 7 Hill 261. The Oswego
Starch Factory vs. Dolloway, 21 N. Y. 449.) These cases, except the
last, were adjudged many years since, and the one in the seventh
volume of Mr. Hill's reports was determined in the Court for the
Correction of Errors. In the first of them the bank had accumu
lated a large surplus, beyond its original capital, which the local
officers had assumed to assess; and in the one against the Farmera'
Loan Company, that corporation had lost more than half of its
large capital, yet it was held, in both instances, that these considerations did not at all affect the taxable valuation, which was,
notwithstanding, to be set down as the capital originally paid in
and secured to be paid in. The basis of these adjudications was,
that the statute had determined what the taxable valuation should
be, by a reference to the nominal capital, and had thus precluded
any inquiry as to the property actually possessed at the time of
making the assessment. The tax is not assessed upon the property or capital possessed at the time the annual inquiries are
made by the proper officers, but upon an amount originally contributed to the corporate enterprise. This was fixed upon, somewhat arbitrarily, it may be said, as representing, with sufficient
practical accuracy, the sum upon which the public burdens ought
to be assessed against the corporation. We .have seen that if the
sum of this original contribution should be diminished to any
extent by losses, or depreciation of -securities, no corresponding
diminution-was to be made in the assessed valuation. The reason
for this was, that the existing assets formed no part of the subject
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by which, according'to the statute, that valuation was to be determined. Another criterion, namely, the original capital, was to be
taken as representing the taxable value. This reason equally
excludes any inquiry into the existing assets, with a view to ascertain whether any part of them are, in their own nature, not subject to taxation. The existing property and securities have, in
truth, nothing to do with the question. Hence, if it could be
shown that the discounted paper held by a bank, or the currency
notes in its drawers, were forgeries, and consequently worthless,
the assessors could not regard that circumstance, because the
existing assets do not enter into the question, and are no part of
the data by which the taxable valuation is to be ascertained.
And, for the same precise reason, when it was shown, on behalf
of the bank which is concerned in this appeal, that its securities
were not in their niature taxable property, the circumstance

becomes utterly immaterial, since neither the character, nor
amount of such securities, has anything to do with the questions which the taxing officers were to determine.
The counsel for the relator has derived an argument from the
declaration of the Revised Statutes, made at the outset of the regulations respecting taxation, that all lands and all personal estate
within this state, whether owned by individuals or by corporations, shall be liable to taxation. (1 R. S. 387, § 1.) The general
principle thus announced, if there were nothing'to qualify it, would
undoubtedly indicate that the existing personal estate and securities of a banking corporation would, be the subjects of taxation.
Yet, it beig. a part ef the system at the same time established,
that the personal estate of these corporations should be the same
aq the original capital, it was found necessary. to qualify this elementary principle by a definition to. the effect that the term pero'na? 'proper y, in its application to. this class of corporationb.
ahould.be construed to include such portion of the capital ap should
not be invest.ed in the real estate. (Id. 388, § 3.) That the term
capital, as here used, is to be interpreted as original or nominal
capital, isevident from the detailed provisions contained in a sub.
sequent part of the regulations, where that term is, for. the pur.
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pose of taxation, more distinctly defined. I refer, of course, to
the direction contained in the title devoted to the assessment of
taxes on incorporated companies, where it is provided that their
capital stock paid in, and secured to be paid in, with the deduction for real estate purchased, is that which is to be reckoned as
the valuation of the personal estate. (Id. 415, § 6, &c.)
Now, it has been said, on the argument, with entire truth and
accuracy, that the principle of our laws for the assessment and
collection of taxes, looks to the taxation of all property of the
taxpayers, whether corporate or individual (with the exception,
originally made, of certain favorite business enterprises) upon an
ad valorem rule. The introductory declaration just referred to is
evidence of this. The manner of assessing corporations was not
intended practically to form an exception to this rule, and in many
cases it would not. It was, no doubt, supposed that the original
contributions of the stockholders would represent with sufficient
practical accuracy the existing personal estate of the corporations.
If they retained their original capital, and periodically divided the
profits realized, there would, in the prescribed method of taxation,
be no departure from the principle; and the occasional fluctuations by which the capital could be temporarily diminished, or the
assets increased, it was probably supposed would balance each
other. If a permanent loss of capital to a considerable amount
should be encountered, the remedy was by an application to the
legislature to reduce the capital, so as to make it correspond with
the actual assets. The examples of this have been frequent.
Where this was not done, the prescribed rule of valuation, though
to a certain limited extent fictitious, would not practically violate
the ad valorem principle. As a system, it was made somewhat
more unequal by the provisions of the act of 1853, continued in
the act we are considering, which added the surplus profits, when
to a certain amount, to the taxable valuation. The consideration
that ten per cent. of an accumulated surplus of earnings was
allowed to escape taxation, shows that the rule of taxing all property at its real value, was not intended to be an inexorable one.
While it was the general principle, it was made to sometimes yield

THE PEOPLE vs. COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES.

to considerations of convenience; but such departure was not, it
may be supposed, considered as a material modification of the*
principle.
I find, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, in this case, an
elaborate and very able argument to show that -even under the
act of 1857, which professed to tax the capital of banks at its
actual vilue, these institutions could not claim an exemption from
taxation on account of their possession of federal securities, even
conceding that such securities were generally exempt from taxation,' under the Constitution of the United States. It is, not
necessary, in the view I have taken, to consider that question. If
the learned judge who prepared that opinion was right, a fortiori,
the act of 1863, which provides for a return to the system of the
Revised Statutes, exludes any pretence for an exemption, on
account of the possession of these securities. It seemed to me,
when the question was before us,. in 1861, that the system of
assessing the capital, at its actual value, would authorize an
inquiry whether any of the property of which that value consisted
was legally exempt from taxation, and that, if found to be so
exempt, that it ought to be deducted from the aggregate taxable
valuation. The judges of this court *ere not unanim6uw upon
that point; there being a sufficient number to give a judgment
who were of opinion that the federal constitution did not contain
any inhibition against the taxation of the national securities in the
hands either of individuals or corporations, the judgment was
placed wholly upon that ground. The Supreme Court of the
United States must, I think, have concurred in the view that I
entertained, for otherwise the constitutional question would not
have been reached. The judges had first to decide that the assessment was upon the United States stock, before they could reverse
our judgment which subjected the stock to'the state tax. A state
court could not preclude the jurisdiction of the federal court by
an incorrect holding, that the constitutional question sought to be
made did not arise.
The foregoing observations are designed to show, that the law
of this state, under which the assessment in controversy was made,
VOL. XII.-85
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did not provide for the assessment of this stock among the mass
of the property of the corporation; that the assessment was upon
another subject, namely, the original capital, and that thus the
immunity of the federal stock from taxation was not an element
of the determination made by the commissioners of taxes in this
case.
But it is argued, that if this were conceded to be so, it would
then appear that the act of 1863 was a premeditated evasion of
the judgment of the national court which ought not to prevail; for
what the legislature cannot do directly it ought not to be allowed
to do at all. The force of this argument is somewhat weakened
by the consideration, that the provisions of that act were only a
return to the system of the Revised Statutes, which regulated the
subject in this state for nearly thirty years. Still, it is not to be
disguised that the system was revived in 1863, with a view to prohibit the banks from availing themselves of an advantage which
every natural .person and the other classes of corporation were
entitled to. It was a measure apparently hostile to the banks and
other corporations embraced in the act, though doubtless originating in considerations of public policy. The exemption of the
immense amount of these securities held by the banking institutions will, no doubt, prove very onerous to the owners of
other property liable to taxation. This is a necessary-consequence
of the immunity conferred upon federal stocks by the constitutional construction to which I have referred. It seems to me
to afford no reason for so shaping state legislation, as to discriminate in a hostile spirit against the investments of moneyed institutions. But we have to deal with the law as we find it written;
and 'I think the appropriate answer to the argument, which
assumes that the act of 1863 is an attempt to do by indirection
what could not be done plainly and directly, is, that the arrangements for state taxation are within the uncontrollable discretion
of the legislature, whose motives are not subject to the criticism
of the courts. If a certain effect shall be found to flow from taxation of one particular subject instead of another, the inconvenience must be submitted to, unless the legislature will consent
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to change the rule. I have, personally, no sympathy with hostile
legislation aimed at particular interests existing under the authority of the laws; but this court has not, as I have said, any jurisdiction to pass upon the motives of the legislative branch of the
government, when no constitutional right is violated ; and there
is no constitutional provision which declares that taxes shall be
assessed equally, and according to value, upon all the property of
the citizens of the state.'
The judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
DAVIES, SELDEN, INGRAHAM and HODGEBOOM, JJ., concurred

in this opinion, and JoHNsoN, J., also delivered a concurring
opinion.
MULLIN, J., (dissenting).--In order to a correct understanding
of the questions arising on this appeal, a brief history of the legislation of the state upon the subject of the taxation of corporations
is necessary. Prior to 1823, there was no statute regulating the
taxation of these institutions. The Supreme Court held in 1817,
in the case of the Clinton Woollen Company vs. Mor8e, cited in the
People vs. The Utica In8urance Company, 15 Johns. R 882, that
corporations were'taxable on their property, in the same manner
as persons, notwithstanding the statute regulating taxation .mentioned persons only, as liable to be assessed, and the term corporation was not used.
In 1823 an act was passed providing, amongst other things, that
all incorporated companies receiving a regular income from the
employment of their capital, should be considered persons within
the meaning of said act, and assessed accordingly. Under this act
they were assessed for the property they owned, both real and
personal, precisely as individuals were assessed, and without
regard to the value of their capital stock. (See Laws of 1823.
p. 395, § 14).
In 1825, the preceding act was amended (see Laws of that year,
ch. 254, sec. 1), and it was provided that it should be the duty of
I The learned judge then proceeds to discuss the question of costs. This par.
of the opinion is necessarily omitted on account of the great length of the case.
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assessors to insert in the assessment rolls the name of each incorporated company liable to be taxed, and the amounts of its capital
paid in, or secured to be paid in, and should designate how much
of it is in real and how much in personal property, and how
much was deducted by reason of stock owned by the state, or
by literary or charitable incorporated companies.
The Revised Statutes adopted the principle of taxation of corporations introduced in the preceding act. By sect. 1, title 4,
chap. 13, part 1st of those statutes, it was provided that all
moneyed or stock corporations deriving an income or profit from
their capital, or otherwise, shall be liable to taxation on their
capital, in the manner thereinafter prescribed.
The next section required the president or some other one of
several officers enumerated, to make and deliver, on or before the
1st of July in each year, to the assessors of the town or ward in
which such company is liable to taxation, a written statement
specifying,
1st. The real estate, if any, owned by such company, where
situated, and the sums paid therefor.
2d. The capital stock actually paid in and secured to be paid
in, excepting therefrom the sums paid for real estate, and the
amount of such capital stock held by the state, and by any incorporated literary or charitable institution.
84. The place where the principal office, or place of transacting the financial business of the company is situated.
The third section required a similar statement to be delivered
to the comptroller on or before the 1st July in each year.
Section 6 required the assessors to enter all incorporated companies from which such statements shall have been received, and
the property of such companies and the property of all other incorporated companies, liable to taxation, in their assessment rolls, in
the following manner :
1st. In the first column the name of each incorporated company in their town liable to taxation, on its capital or otherwise,
and under its name the amount of its capital stock paid in and
secured to be paid in, the amount paid by it for real estate then
belonging to such company, and the amount of its stock belonging
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to the state and to incorporated literary and charitable institutiond.

2d. Iv the second column. the quantity of real estate owned by
such --ompany in such town, and in the third column the actual
igM(e thereof.
3d. In the fourth column the capital stock of every incorpotated company, except manufacturing and turnpike corporations
and marine insurance companies, paid in and secuied to be paid
in, after deducting the sums paid out for all the real estate of such
company, and the amount of stock held by the state and by literary and charitable institutions.
The 7th section required the assessors to insert in the column
above mentioned the cash value of the 8tock of all manufacturing
and turnpike corporations,to be aspertainedby the 8ales of the stock
or in any other manner, deducting therefrom the items hereinbefore mentioned, which value, together with the value of the real
tstate,, shall constitute the amount on which the tax shall be
ussessed.
By the 10th section it is declared that the capital stock of every
company liable to taxation, except such part as shall be excepted
;n the assessment roll and by the preceding sections, shall be
assessed and taxed in the same manner as the other real and personal estate of the county, unless such company commute.
The 18th section provides that the taxes so assessed shall be
paid out of the funds of the company, and shall be rateably
deducted from the dividends of those stockholders wh6se stock was
taxed, or shall be charged upon such stock if no dividends be afterwards declared.
We now come to the act of 1857, chapter 456, by which the
preceding provisions were in some respects materially changed.
Section 3 of that act is in the following words : " The capital stock
of every company liable to taxation, except such part of it as shall
have been excepted in the assessment roll, or as shall have been
exempted by law, together with its surplus profits or reserved
funds exceeding 10 per cent. of its capital after deducting the
assessed value of its real estate, and all shares of stock in other
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corporations actually owned by such company which are taxable
on their capital stock under the laws of this state, shall be assessct
at its actual value in the same manner as other real and personal
estate of the county."
From this brief outline of the legislation of the state on the
subject of corporate taxation, it will be seen that it has undergone
two radical changes. It was first on the property, next on the
capital stock paid in, and third, upon its actual value at the time
of the assessment; and under each and all of these systems, the
obvious intention was to assess property only.
The third section of the act of 1857 was in force in 1859, when
the commissioners of taxes, &c., for the city of New York assessed
the Bank of Commerce of said city on its whole capital
paid in and secured to be paid in, less so much thereof as had
been paid out for real estate, and refused to deduct from the
amount assessed the sum of $108,000 invested in the stocks of the
United States, and which stocks were actually owned by the bank
at the time the tax was assessed. A certiorari was issued out of
the Supreme Court, on the application of the bank, directed to
said commissioners, requiring them to make return thereto, and
the commissioners did return thereto the facts aforesaid. And
the said court, after hearing counsel, affirmed the proceedings,
upon the ground that the tax was really upon the stock of the
corporation and not upon the property in which the money paid
in by the stockholders was invested. An appeal was thereupon
taken to this court.
After argument, the judgment of the
Supreme Court was affirmed. It was held by the majority of the
court :
1st. That stock in the public debt of the United States, whether
owned by individuals or corporations, is taxable under the laws of
the United States.
2d. That taxation by the state of property invested in a loan to
the Federal Government is not forbidden by the Constitution of the
United States, when no unfriendly discrimination to the United
States as borrowers, is applied by the state law; and property in its
atock is subjected to no greater burdens than property in general.
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An appeal was taken from the judgment of this court to the
Supreme Court of the United States, and it was by that court
reversed. NELSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court (2 Am.
Law Reg. 614). He commences his opinion by saying that i the
question involved in this case is whether or not the stock of the
United States, constituting a part of the whole of the capital stock
of a bank organized under the banking laws of New York, is
subject to state taxation. The capital of the bank is taxed under
existing laws in that state upon a valuation like the property of
individual citizens, and not as formerly, on the amount of the
nominal capital, without regard to loss or depreciation. According to that system of taxation it was immaterial as to the character
or description of property which constituted the capital, as the
tax imposedwas wholly irrespective of it. The tax was like one
annexed to the franchise as a royalty for the grant. ]But since
the change of this system it is agreed the ta± is upon the property
constituting the capital. This stock, then, is held by the bank
the same as such stocks are held by individuals, and alike subject
to taxation or exemption by state authority."
After stating the grounds upon which it was sought' to distinguish the case before him from NAorton vs. The City douncil of
Charleston, 2 Peters 449, the learned judge proceeds : " It will
be seen, therefore; that the distinction claimed rests upon a limitation of the exercise of the taxing power of the state ; that if the
tax is imposed indiscriminately upon all the property of th9 indivHual or corporation, the stock may be included in the valuation;
if.not, it must be excluded or cannot be reached."
The reason why the states may not tax the stocks of the federal
government, is, that it is a tax upon the exercise of the power of
Congress to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and
the exercise of such power is interfered with to the extent of: the
tax imposed. The tax was declared to be a violation, not of an
act of Congress merely, but of the Constitution of the United
States, and therefore 'oid.
It will be remembered tat the tax thus declared void by the
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federal court was assessed under the act of 1857, upon the capital 8tock of the corporationat its actual value.
These propositions must be deemed to be decided by the case
of the People vs. The Commissioners of Taxes.
1st. That a tax on the capital stock of a corporation at its
actual value is a tax on the property actually owned by the corporation at the time the tax is assessed.
2d. That when such property consists in whole or in part of the
steck of the United States, it is exempt from'.taxation ; and
3d. A tax on such stocks, being the property of, a corporation,
is unconstitutional and void.
After the reversal of the judgment of this court by the Supreme
Court of the United States, and in 1863, the legislature of this
state passed an act entitled " An act in relation to the taxation
of moneyed corporations." See chapter 240 of the Laws of 1863.
By the first section of that act it is provided , that all banks
and banking associations, and other moneyed corporations and
associations shall be liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the
amount of their capitalstock paid in or secured to be paid in, and
their surplus earnings less 10 per cent. of such -urplus in the
manner now provided by law, deducting the value of the real estate
held by such corporation or association and taxable as real
estate."
Banks from and after the passage of said act are liable to taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid
in. "A valuation of what? Of its property ? If so then the stocks
of the United States owned by the bank are, under the decision
of the federal court above cited, taxed in manifest disregard of
that decision.
If the valuation contemplated by the act is of the stock of the
bank, the case is still within the one cited, for in that case the
assessment was on the capital 3tock at its actual value.
If there is to be a valuation, it must be a valuation of property
of some sort, and if it is of neither the capital nor property of
the corporation, I am unable to understand what the subject of
valuation is that is intended by the act referred to.
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It is said that the words cc shall be liable to taxation on a valuation," are wholly unmeaning, that the act of 1863 is to be read as
if no such words were in it, and that the intention of the legislature
was to restore the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1830; the
act of 1857 introducing, as it is said, a new rule of taxation.
Whoever will refer. to the reports of the Comptroller since 1830,
will find repeated complaints against the injustice of the rule of
taxation prescribed by the Revised Statutes. It was found that
under them corporations were sometimes taxed upon the full amount
of their capital when the largest part of it had been lost, and
when, so far from deriving a profit from their capital they were
running in debt.
The courts had held that if a corporation was in the receipt of
any income from it, it was liable to be assessed on its 'whole capital, although one-half -or two-thirds might have been lost by the
vicissitudes of business. .Bank of Utica vs. City of Utica, 4
Paige 399; Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. vs. The Mayor, &c., of
New York, 7 Hill, 261.
It was to remedy this injustice that the act of 1857 was passed,
whereby the actual instead of the nominal value of the capital
stock was adopted as the measure of taxation.
Although the act of 1863 does not declare what is the subject
of valuation, the doubt, if any, is removed by reference to other
provisions of the statutes relating to taxation. By § 1, title 1,
chapter 13, part 1st of the Revised Statutes, all lands and all personal estate within this state are declared liable to taxation:
Section 3 of the same chapter declares that the terms "personal
eitate" and "personal property" whenever they occur in said

chapter, shall be construed to include all household furniture, &c.,
stocks in moneyed corportions. " They shall also be construed t4
tnclude such portions of the capital of incorporatedcompanies liable

to taxation on their capital as shall not be invested in real estdte."
It was property that the legislature intended to tax, and that
property was, first, the real estate of the corporation, and second,
its stock, at a valuation equal to the amount paid in or secured
to be paid, less the amount paid for its real estate and stock held
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by certain corporations. This was the measure of valuation of
what the legislature had just declared to be the personal estate of
the corporation.
The valuation is to be made from year to year, and it must
necessarily be of the stock, at the time when each assessment is
made, and it is none the less a valuation because the statute
instead of the assessors ascertains and fixes the value. For these
reasons I do not think it was the intention -to revive the system
of taxation introduced by the Revised Statutes. The measure of
valuation only was revived.
But assuming that the act of 1868 is to be taken to be a restoration of the system of taxation under the Revised Statutes, I still
deny that the tax is not assessed upon the property of the corporation. We have first the general provisions of the tax laws that
real and personal property is the subject of taxation. This
excludes the idea that franchises are the things to be assessed and
taxed. Next we have the residue of the capital stock of corporations after deducting the cost of their real estate, declared to be
personal property within the intent and meaning of the same law.
In view of these provisions it cannot be said that it was the intention of the legislature to tax some ideal thing, existing only in the
imagination, and disregard wholly the provisions to which I have
just referred.
I have shown that before 1823 the proper owned- by corporations was taxed in the same way and to the same extent as that
of persons. The act of 1823 recognized and adopted that method
of taxation. The Revised Statutes- required the taxation to be
upon the capital, declaring so much of that capital to be personal
estate as remained after deducting the. sum paid for real estate.
The reasons for this change are obvious. When a corporation was
organized, the amount of its capital stock paid in was taken from
the individual corporator and transferred to the corporation. This
amount, unless subjected to assessment against the corporation,
would be relieved from taxation altogether, and thus injustice
done to other taxpayers of the state. If the tax was assessed
directly on the property of the corporation as it existed when the
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assessment came to be made, the debts of the company must be
deducted and inquiry made into the profits or losses in its business.
Such inquiries would involve assessors in great difficulties, and
instead, therefore, of assessing the items of property owned by the
corporation, its 8t0ck is made the subject of assessment.
It will be seen by reference to the provisions of the Revised
Statutes above cited, that a distinction is made in the measure of
assessment between manufacturing and turnpike corporations and
other incorporated companies. Manufacturing and turnpike corporations are, like all other corporations, required to be assessed
on their capital, but it is on the capital at it8 ca8 value in the
mzarket. Moneyed corporations were required to be assessed on
the amount of capital paid in or secured to be paid in, after making
certain specified deductions.
Both classes of corporations were taxed on capital, but that
capital was not measured by the same standard of valuation. In
the one case it was the actual cash value, in the other the amount
paid in without regard to its value or the profits made or losses
sustained by the corporation.
The act of 1857 adapted and applied to all moneyed corporations the provisions of the Revised Statutes in relation to manufacturing and turnpike corporations, which required the assessment to be made on the actual value.
is the subject of taxation changed because the measure of valuation is altered? If the property of a corporation is actually
assessed when its stock is entered in the assessment roll at its
cash value, is not the same property taxed when its stock is valued
at the amount originally paid or secured to be paid in? If the
assessors found the value of the stock of a manufacturing company'
to be equal to the amount originally paid in, and the assessment
on that basis is, in fact, a tax on the property then owned by. tne
corporation under the decision of the federal court in the case of
the Bank of Commerce, cited supra, a tax on the capital of a
bank at its par value is also an assessment on its property within
the same decision. It seems to me impossible to distinguish tbo
cases.
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As I have already suggested, there was a propriety as well as
necessity for the establishment of a fixed and arbitrary measure
of valuation of corporate stock, arising from the difficulty in the
case of moneyed corporations of arriving at actual cash value.
Such arbitary rule of valuation might, in many cases, work injustice by assessing property as existing that had been wholly or
principally lost. But if profits were made, if the market value of
the stock exceeded the par value, the moneyed corporation escaped
taxation on such excess, while the manufacturing and turnpike
corporation would be assessed upon the cash value of the stock
when the same was above as well as when below par.
The act of 1863 is more severe upon moneyed corporations than
were the provisions of the Revised Statutes. Under the latter
the surplus profits or reserved funds were not subject to assessment, but under the act of 1863 they are liable to be assessed.
If the act of 1863 does not assess the property of the corporation, why are these surplus profits subjected to assessment? They
are no part of the capital stock paid in or secured to be paid in,
as these words are understood by those who insist that the capital
stock and the property of the corporation are not one and the
same thing. If these surplus profits are invested in stocks of the
United States they are surely exempt from taxation, and what
good reason can be assigned why they should not also be exempt
when they are purchased with capital ?
The words capital and capital stock are used in several different
senses as well in the statutes as in common parlance. The sum specified in the charter of a corporation as the amount of money
which it must have subscribed in order to authorize it to exercise
its franchises, is called capital stock. Again, this amount when
paid in by the corporators is called the capital stock. But the
more accurate definition of the words is given by this court, in the
case of the Buffalo Mutual Insurance Company vs. Supervisors
of Erie, 4 Comst. 442, in which it was held that the stock, or
capital stock, of a corporation i8 the fund or capital, consistingof
money or goods employed in conducting the business qf the company. In other words, the property which the company employed
in its business.
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Within this definition, the word valuation, in the act of 1863,
becomes very significant, and manifests an intention on the part
of the legislature to treat the capital as property, and to subject
it to taxation as such.
It seems to me, therefore, that from these several provisions of
the statutes, and from the decisions of the courts, it is obvious
that the capital stock of a corporation is the property vwhich it owns,
and which it uses in the transaction of its business and that when
the law requires the capital of a corporation to be taxed, it means
the property thus owned by it, and which represents the capital;
and when it directs the valuation of the stock, the valuation must
be regulated by the value of the property so owned, unless
another and arbitrary valuation is required to be made.
'If I am right in this, then United States stocks owned by'the
bank at- the time an assessment is made are taxed, if the whole
capital is taxed without exempting such stocks, in direct- violation
of the authority of the federal government.
There is nothing in any of the provisions of the tax laws that
gives support to the position that the tax upon the capital stock,
required by the act of 1863, is in effect a tax on the franchise, or,
as Judge NELSoN expresses it, a royalty for the grant of'the franchise. A franchise is undoubtedly property, and it may be taxed,
and it is quite probable that such a tax would not conflict with the
constitution or laws of the United States. But I cannot find that
any such tax has ever been assessed in this state, and so radical a
change in the system of corporate taxation would not be introduced without clearly manifesting such intention. None has been
manifested.
Again, it would be somewhat absurd to assess a bank a gross
sum on its franchise and then deduct from it money paid out for
real estate and stock held in such corporation by the state,. and
literary and charitable associations. If the legislature had, in
the act of 1863, expressly provided that the franchise might be
assessed, and then authorized the foregoing deduction, no person
could wink so hard as not to see that it was designed as an evasion
of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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I entertain no doubt, that the tax assessed on the relator wam
a tax on the stocks of the United States held by it, and which are
exempt from taxation by the constitution and laws of the United
States, nor that such tax is unconstitutional and void.
WRIGHT, J., concurred with MULLEN, J.
The question raised in this case is a
fresh illustration of the inherent difficulty in our complex form of government, of drawing the line between the
rights of the. General Government and
the powers of the respective states. On
the one hand, the instruments of the
General Government, such as securities,
are exempt from state control or taxation; on the other, the states may, by a
device derived frbm some conceded
power, attempt to substantially exercise the control which has been explicitly denied to them. In the present
case it is notorious that the Legislature
of New York disguised, under a thin
veil, its intention to thwart in part the
decision of the federal judiciary, that
United States securities are not subject
to state taxation. It is well known that
the banks of New York are very large
holders of these securities, and that in
the exigencies of the times, it may be
necessary to call on them to subscribe
for more. Prudence would seem to
dictate that they should be placed in no
inferior condition to other holders of
these securities. Yet the legislature
has taxed them, while most other corporations as well as individuals are exempt. As the law stands at present,
the legislative design has been successful The decision is, however, subject
to- review by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Our own views upon this subject may
be extreme; and it is with unfeigned
diffidence that we venture to differ from
the majority of the court in the present

case. Yet wecannot avoid .the conclusion, that the present tax is in substance a tax upon the securities of the
United States. Some reliance has been
placed by those who sustain the tax on
an expression by NzLsox, J., in the
Supreme Court of the United States
(People vs. Com'rs. of Taxes, 2 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 614) that a tax of this kind is
a tax on the corporate franchise. This
remark was, however, merely a dictum.
Such evidently was not the intention
of the legislature, and no stress was
laid upon this view by any members of
the court in deciding the principal case.
For the sake of the utmost brevity consistent with clearness, and without reviewing or repeating the arguuients
found in the judges' opinions, our views
are submitted in the form of propositions.
I. It seems to us that there is a
marked distinction between the law
under which this case was decided and
the Revised Statutes. The Revised
Statutes substantially provided for a
tax on the capital stock of moneyed corporations paid in, and secured to be paid
in, excepting the sums paid for real
estate. The assessors were in no case
to estimate the value of the real estate,
unless it happened to be situated within
their own town or ward. This valuation
was made for the purpose of local taxation. Under this system, every element
necessary for an assessment of taxes on
capital stock was furnished in advance
to the assessors. They had a mere
clerical duty to perform, which was to
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deduct the sums paidforreal estate from
the capital stock paid in. Under the
law of 1863, three interests are mentioned--capital stock, earnings, and
real estate. There is a plain departure
from the language of the Revised
Statutes concerning real estate. The
assessors are not required to deduct the
"sums paid for real estate," but "the
value of the real estate." This may be
much more or much less than the
amount paid for it. The worth of the
real estate can only be ascertained by a
valuation, or act of the mind on the part
of the assessors. The same remark
may be made of the surplus earnings.
The only method of ascertaining the
earnings, is by an estimate of their
value, or by a valuation. They do not
always appear in the form of money,
but rather in the guise of commercial
paper, and 'it might be necessary to
determine whether it was available or
worthless. The third interest would
logically require an estimate also, but
the law arbitrarily provides that the
assessors need not exercise any actual
judgment, but must accept an arbitrary
valuation, depending on the capital
stock paid in. The system, under the
two laws, is so different that we think
no safe conclusions can be drawn from
the decisions under the Revised Statutes, which will apply to the law of
1863. In other words, when the law
of 1863 provides for taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of capital
stock paid in and surplus earnings,
-deducting the value of real estate, the
word "valuation" is employed in its ordinary sense of "estimation" as to
surplus earnings; the word value is
employed as to real estate in the signification of the result of an act of valuation, and no reason is perceived why
the word "valuation" should not have
the same sense in its application to
capital stock, except thdt the judgment
of the assessors is controlled by the

arbitrary standard of the statute. Every
interest is thus the subject of valuation.
one is measured by a fixed standard;
the other two by the best judgment of
the assessors. Their minds act in each
case; in one, the evidence of value is
furnished by the statute; in the other
two, the evidence is unrestricted. Under
this view the United States securities
should have been deducted from the
subject valued, and a tax including
them is void.
II. But assuming that the intention
of the legislature was to restore the
system established under the Revised
Statutes, we are still of opinion that the
tax is upon property, and that the object of that legislation was to establish
an arbitrary standard of valuation of
capital stock as property.
If we look at a bank at the moment
of its organization, it cannot be denied
that a tax on its capital stock is a tax
on its property. The language of the
Revised Statutes leads to the same conclusion. The capital stock actually paid
in, or secured to be paid in, is the subject of assessment; the sums paid for
real estate are to be deducted. These
words are unmeaning unless they apply
to property. Nothing can show the
intention more clearly than the 10th
section (1 Rev. Stat. 416, J 10)- "The
capital stock of every company liable to
taxation, except such part of it as shall
have been excepted in the assessment
roll, and by the previous sections of
this title, shall be assessed and taxed in
the same manner as the other real and
personal estate of the county," &c. . All
capital stock is here used as synonymous in meaning with real and personal estate, although two modes oJ
assessing it are provided. The phrase
"capital stock," is not used in a technical sense; if it were, it would not hav
been distributed into "real and pcisonal estate." If then a bank, since
its organization, has sustained no de-
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preciation of its property, and has
employed its capital in the ordinary
business of banking, dividing its earniugs among its stockholders, a tax on
an amount equal to its capital stock, is
a tax on its whole property. In the
exceptional case, where its stock has
been depreciated, the tax is still on its
property, though all inquiry into its
actual amount is precluded by the
statutory rule. It does not seem that
the case is different from a law which
should provide that taxes should be laid
on individuals upon an amount equal to
the property which they possessed at
the last state census. If their property
continued unchanged in amount, an
assessment would be made upon their
actual estates. If it had appreciated or
depreciated, an unchanging tax would
still be levied. In other words, such a
law would cause a uniform instead of a
fluctuating charge upon the tax-payers,
in reference to their property. Such a
system may have its advantages. The
land-tax in England is of this kind.
"In the year 1692, a general valuation
was made of the income of all the land
in the country, and upon that valuation
the land-tax continues to be levied to
this day, so that the tax of four shillings
in thi pound upon the rents of land, is
a fifth of its rent in 1692, and not of the
actual rent at the present day" (SAY's
Pol. Economy 440, Philadelphia translation, 1832). If the land should become valueless, there could be no doubt
that the owner would still be taxed on
his property at an arbitrary valuation.
If the New York Revised Statutes had
provided that lands belonging to moneyed corporations should be taxed at
a valuation equal to the amount paid
for them, the provision would have been
quite analogous to the English land-tax.
III. The question recurs, whether the
state legislature can constitutionally
preclude all inquiry into the amount of
property which corporations or indi-

viduals possess. Beyond doubt, it can
when only state action is concerned.
There are no general restrictions in the
state constitution upon the legislative
exercise of the power of taxation. But
it is a very different question, whether
this can be done when its effect would
be to interfere with a power of the
General Government. Suppose that the
New York Legislature had franklystated
its intention-suppose it had enacted in
the body of the law that the corporation
should be taxed upon an amount equal
to the capital stock paid in, deducting
the value of its real estate, but. without
any deduction for its United States securities. Would such a law have been
constitutional? We think not. Yet the
legislature has substantially done this.
It has directed the value of real estate
to be deducted. from capital stock, thus
tacitly including United States securities, and required the value of surplus
earnings to be added, even though invested in the bonds of the General
Government. The United States securities, as we have previously said (2
Am. Law Reg. N. S.89i, are the instrumentsor machinery by which the power
of Congress to borrow money is exercised. No state can by any law interfere
with the free and unrestricted use of
these instruments. It would seem that
so transparent a device to impede their
action as this recent one of the New
York Legislature, should not be sustained..
The argument ab inconvenienti is here
very strong. If the state legislature
can in this circuitous manner thwart
the action of the General Government,
the power of Congress to borrow money
is greatly restricted, if not practically
nullified. From the nature of the case,
this power must be exercised in connection with the moneyed corporations at
our great commercial centres. An unfriendly or indifferent legislature might
have the General Government completely

